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The Future of Copyright 
 
FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO 
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY.  By Lawrence 
Lessig.†  New York: The Penguin Press, 2004.  Pp. xvii, 346.  
$24.95. 
 
Reviewed by Lawrence B. Solum* 
 
Somebody once said: “Information wants to be free.”1 
—Roger Clarke 
 
There’s no such thing as a free lunch.2 
—Alvin Hansen 
I. Introduction: Idea Slingers and Norm Entrepreneurs 
Sometimes technological change is so profound that it rocks the 
foundations of an entire body of law.  Peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing 
systems—Napster, Gnutella, KaZaA, Grokster, and Freenet3—are mere 
 
 † C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. 
 * Copyright © 2005 Lawrence A. Solum.  Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  
Readers familiar with my traditional academic work are likely to notice that this Review is just a 
little bit unusual, departing in ways large and small from the rather plodding, methodical, and 
analytic stuff that I usually write.  I am grateful to the editors of the Texas Law Review for 
convincing me to turn a series of blog (or weblog) posts on Legal Theory Blog into this Review.  
For the originals, see Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Bookclub: Free Culture by Lawrence 
Lessig, http://lsolum.blogspot.com (including link on sidebar, “Legal Theory Bookclub: Lessig’s 
Free Culture,” with hyperlink to first of eight posts). 
 Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Review in whole or in part 
for educational or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use, 
subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation to this publication of 
the Review, and this copyright notice and grant of permission be included in the copies. 
1. Roger Clarke, Information Wants to be Free . . . , at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/ 
Roger.Clarke/II/IWtbF.html (last modified Aug. 28, 2001).  The origin of the phrase is obscure.  A 
precursor, “Information should be free,” has been attributed to Peter Samson, a member of the MIT 
Tech Model Railroad Club.  “Information wants to be free” is usually attributed to Stewart Brand.  
Id. 
2. See Contributing to the History of Words and Ideas, JSTORNEWS para. 3, at 
http://www.jstor.org/news/2000.11/words.link.html (Nov. 2000) (noting a “1952 article in the 
journal Ethics [that] attributes the saying to ‘Professor Alvin Hansen in his famous TINSTAAFL 
formula—“There’s no such thing as a free lunch”’”); see also ROBERT HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A 
HARSH MISTRESS (Tor 1996) (1966); MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE 
LUNCH (1975).  The origin of the phrase is obscure. 
3. See Peer-to-Peer, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/peer-to-peer (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) 
(listing those five systems as implementing P2P filesharing). 
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symptoms of a set of technological innovations that have set in motion an 
ongoing process of fundamental changes in the nature of copyright law.  The 
video tape recorder begat the Sony “substantial noninfringing use” defense.4  
The digital cassette recorder begat the Audio Home Recording Act.5  The 
internet begat the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.6  Napster begat 
Napster.7  We see the law morph right in front of our eyes, but its ultimate 
form is still obscure.  As a consequence, the future of copyright is up for 
grabs.  We live in a magical, exhilarating, and frightening time: Many 
alternative copyfutures8 shimmer on the horizon, sometimes coming into 
sharper focus and sometimes fading away. 
In this heady atmosphere, the idea slingers are at work.  Richard Posner 
and William Landes have proposed indefinitely renewable copyrights.9  Neil 
Netanel,10 William Fisher,11 and others propose to legalize P2P filesharing 
and replace the lost revenues with a tax on hardware and internet service.  
Joseph Liu suggests that the scope of fair use should grow with time.12  Mark 
Lemley is debunking ex post justifications for intellectual property.13  No 
surprise, the academics do not have a monopoly on idea slinging.  The 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA) have gone on the offensive, proposing 
legislation like the “Induce Act,” targeted at shutting down P2P filesharing 
services that allow third parties to share copyrighted content.14 
 
4. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428 (1984) (holding that the 
sale of tape recorders and photocopying machines does not constitute contributory infringement 
because they are “capable of substantial noninfringing uses,” and “have substantial benefit for some 
purposes”). 
5. Audio Home Recording Act, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4242 (1992) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2000)). 
6. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
7. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
8. By copyfutures, I mean to refer to the possible future states of copyright law.  For the 
neologism “copyfutures,” see Copyfutures, at http://lsolum.typepad.com/copyfutures (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2004) (pointing to a blog on the future of copyright). 
9. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 471 (2003); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 210–49 (2003). 
10. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-
Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003). 
11. See WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENTERTAINMENT 199–258 (2004) (proposing a system in which the government would pay 
copyright holders a share of such tax revenues based on the relative popularity of their creations). 
12. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002). 
13. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 129, 132 (2004). 
14. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). 
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In a very real sense, we are in the midst of an intellectual, moral, and 
legal struggle over the future of copyright.  Intellectually, the “copyfight,”15 
the struggle over the future of the rights to duplicate and transform 
information, takes place in the realm of ideas—between the covers of law 
reviews, in position papers, on editorial pages, and online in the 
blogosphere.16  Legally, major skirmishes have already occurred in the 
federal courts, from the United States Supreme Court’s decision to uphold 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)17 in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft18 to the recent split between the Seventh19 and Ninth Circuits20 over 
the question whether P2P filesharing services are contributory copyright 
infringers.  Heated copyfighting takes place in the back rooms of Congress 
and elsewhere inside the beltway, where the consumer electronic industry 
recently refused to come to terms with the RIAA and the MPAA over the 
terms of the Induce Act.21  Last, but not least, the copyfight includes a moral 
and ideological battle for the hearts and minds of an increasingly global 
public.  The RIAA and the MPAA labor (mostly without success) to 
convince a generation that has grown up ripping, burning, and downloading 
that the use of a P2P filesharing program is the moral equivalent of 
shoplifting a CD.22 
No copywarrior is more prominent and influential than Larry Lessig.  
Lessig was the brilliant architect of Eric Eldred’s failed challenge to the 
CTEA’s retroactive twenty-year extension of copyright terms—effectively a 
 
15. See Copyfight, at http://www.corante.com/copyfight/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) (pointing 
to a blog focusing on copyright issues); A Copyfighter’s Musings, at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
cmusings/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) (same). 
16. The blogosphere is the interconnected world of blogs.  See Blogosphere, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/blogosphere (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) (defining the term). 
17. See Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) 
(amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1994)).  The Act was passed by both the House and Senate on 
October 7, 1998 and signed by President Clinton on October 27, 1998. 
18. 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003). 
19. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651–63 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that 
sufficient evidence existed for a preliminary injunction against Aimster, the internet provider of a 
P2P filesharing service, due to a likely finding of contributory copyright infringement). 
20. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. 
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (affirming a district court holding that the distributors of P2P 
filesharing software were not contributory copyright infringers because they did not have 
knowledge of the copyright infringement and did not materially contribute to the copyright 
infringement). 
21. Katie Dean, Senate Shelves Induce Review, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/ 
news/politics/0,1283,65255,00.html (Oct. 7, 2004). 
22. See Privacy & Piracy: The Paradox of Illegal File-Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and 
the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. 
on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 108th Cong. 82 (Sept. 30, 2003) (statement 
of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman & CEO, RIAA) (“The music industry has, for a number of years, 
undertaken a massive campaign to educate consumers regarding the illegality of the unauthorized 
distribution of copyrighted music online.”). 
1140 Texas Law Review [Vol. 83:1137 
 
twenty-year moratorium on new works entering the public domain.23  (Just 
getting Eldred to the Supreme Court was no mean accomplishment; getting 
votes to strike down the CTEA was truly remarkable.)  Lessig is an idea 
slinger par excellance, the author of Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace24 
and The Future of Ideas25—enormously influential books.  And now the 
litigator and idea slinger has remade himself as a “norm entrepreneur”26—a 
public figure with the towering ambition of reshaping “copynorms”27—the 
fundamental set of social norms that shape perceptions of the morality of 
filesharing and the legitimacy of legislation that shrinks the public domain. 
Lessig’s most sustained attempt to reshape copynorms is his most recent 
book, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock 
Down Culture and Control Creativity.28  The title gives it away.  Free 
Culture is no academic exercise.  And Lessig is remarkably frank about this: 
 My method is not the usual method of an academic.  I don’t want to 
plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to 
obscure French theorists—however natural that is for the weird sort 
we academics have become.  Instead I begin in each part with a 
collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently 
simple ideas can be more fully understood.
29
 
Free Culture wants to win hearts and minds for a great cause—a radical 
paradigm shift from corporate culture to free culture, from selling to sharing, 
and from intellectual property to intellectual commons.  Just when it looked 
like our copyfuture would be dominated by a few giant media 
conglomerates—vast integrated empires of publishing, music distribution, 
and motion picture production—Lessig announces a future modeled on the 
open-source software movement, a future in which small-scale enterprises 
and individuals build a vast intellectual commons dedicated to the 
propositions that information shall be free and ideas shall not be owned. 
 
23. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186. 
24. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
25. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD (2002). 
26. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996) 
(originating the phrase “norm entrepreneur”); see also Dorothea Kübler, On the Regulation of 
Social Norms, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449, 449–50 (2001) (developing a model analyzing how 
norms are influenced by “‘norm entrepreneurs’ such as lawmakers, government agencies, [and] 
unions”), available at http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wt1/papers/2001/norms.pdf.  I am grateful to 
David McGowan for discussion on this point. 
27. For the definition of the term “copynorm,” see Copynorms, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Copynorms (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
28. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) [hereinafter LESSIG, FREE 
CULTURE]. 
29. Id. at 13. 
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Because Lessig’s method of exposition is unusual for the kind of book 
usually reviewed in these pages, so shall be the approach of this Review.  
Lessig tells stories.  The Review will nudge, worry, and pick at the stories 
that Lessig tells.  Along the way, I hope to illuminate Lessig’s themes and 
raise some questions about his conclusions.  Of the stories that Lessig tells, 
some work and some don’t.  Of the conclusions that Lessig draws from his 
stories, some follow and some don’t.  In the end, I hope to draw out some 
large implications from Lessig’s tales of free culture.  Like Lessig, I will 
adopt a somewhat breezy tone, but unlike Lessig, I shall be aiming at 
academic rigor. 
This Review is about Free Culture, the book and the ideas for which it 
stands.  In Part II, we will take a look at the phrase “free culture” itself, 
attempting to glean the central idea of Free Culture, the book.  Part III takes 
a look at Lessig’s indictment of the big media companies and the power that 
copyright law gives them over public culture.  In Part IV, we look at Lessig’s 
arguments that “piracy” can actually be a good thing, and, in Part V, we see 
how he applies those ideas to P2P filesharing.  Part VI investigates Lessig’s 
arguments about the social costs of intellectual property rights; Part VII 
adumbrates his four-part typology of laws, markets, norms, and architecture 
as the modalities of regulation.  In Part VIII, we look at Lessig’s discussion 
of the relationship between copyrights and copynorms, and in Part IX, we 
examine Lessig’s postmortem on the Eldred v. Ashcroft case.  In Part X, we 
take a brief look at Lessig’s proposals for the future of copyright.  Part XI 
concludes.  Free Culture is a sprawling book, and this is a sprawling Review. 
II. Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose 
What does the phrase “Free Culture”—the dominant motif of Lessig’s 
book—really mean?  In the preface, Lessig gives a hint about what is to 
come: 
[W]e come from a tradition of “free culture”—not “free” as in “free 
beer” (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the freesoftware 
movement), but “free” as in “free speech,” “free markets,” “free 
trade,” “free enterprise,” “free will,” and “free elections.”  A free 
culture supports and protects creators and innovators.  It does this 
directly by granting intellectual property rights.  But it does so 
indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that 
follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the 
control of the past.  A free culture is not a culture without property, 
just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free.  The 
opposite of a free culture is a “permission culture”—a culture in which 
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creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful, or of 
creators from the past.
30
 
And he clarifies his position: 
[A]n argument for free culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to 
avoid, and even harder to understand.  A free culture is not a culture 
without property; it is not a culture in which artists don’t get paid.  A 
culture without property, or in which creators can’t get paid, is 
anarchy, not freedom.  Anarchy is not what I advance here. 
 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance 
between anarchy and control.  A free culture, like a free market, is 
filled with property.  It is filled with rules of property and contract that 
get enforced by the state.  But just as a free market is perverted if its 
property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by 
extremism in the property rights that define it.  That is what I fear 




These passages reveal something important about the aim of Free 
Culture.  Rhetoric and not rigorous argument is the currency of the norm 
entrepreneur.  And quite naturally, academic readers will get a bit antsy 
about the looseness of Lessig’s arguments and the imprecision of his 
language. “Free will” and “free markets” aren’t really “free” in the same 
sense.32  “A balance between anarchy and control”—that’s a nice phrase, but 
what does it really mean? 
Let me be clear.  Academic standards are surely not the only valid 
standards.  Fine rhetoric can play an important social role—opening minds 
and hearts to new possibilities.  If Free Culture succeeds as a political tract, 
it will be a success on its own terms.  If Free Culture does more—if it is a 
political tract that advances important and enduring new ideas—then it will 
be in proud company with Cato’s Letters and the Federalist Papers, to name 
just two exemplars of persuasive writing that transcend the pejorative phrase 
“mere rhetoric.” 
Another important clue to the meaning and method of Free Culture 
comes in its Introduction.  Free Culture persuades by telling stories, and 
Lessig’s first story is a doozy that vividly illustrates the connection between 
technological change and legal change.  The story is about the Wright 
brothers and the invention of the airplane.33  The advent of the airplane 
 
30. Id. at xiv (footnote omitted). 
31. Id. at xvi. 
32. The phrase “free will” comes from the free-will/determinism debate in the philosophy of 
mind.  The term “free” in “free will” means something like “not casually determined.”  The term 
“free” in “free markets” means something like “not regulated.”  Unregulated and undetermined are 
two quite different ideas. 
33. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
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created a new problem for property law.  The Latin maxim “cujus est solum 
ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos” means, “To whomsoever the soil 
belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths.”34  A mechanical 
application of this doctrine would create a “tragedy of the anticommons”35 
for air travel: Airplanes would be trespassers and, given the huge number of 
individual property owners from whom permissions would need to be 
obtained, air travel would be practically impossible.36  But this rule gave way 
in the face of the new technology of air travel in United States v. Causby,37 in 
which Justice Douglas wrote: 
[The] doctrine has no place in the modern world.  The air is a public 
highway, as Congress has declared.  Were that not true, every 
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass 
suits.  Common sense revolts at the idea.  To recognize such private 
claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere 
with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer 
into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.
38
 
Lessig uses Causby to tell a story about the relationship between 
technological change and legal change.  He claims that the quoted passage 
from Causby shows how technological change is translated into legal change 
by instrumentalist judging: 
 This is how the law usually works.  Not often this abruptly or 
impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works.  It was Douglas’s 
style not to dither.  Other justices would have blathered on for pages 
to reach the conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: “Common 
sense revolts at the idea.”  But whether it takes pages or a few words, 
it is the special genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the 
law adjusts to the technologies of the time.  And as it adjusts, it 
 
34. Drummond v. White Oak Fuel, 140 S.E. 57, 59–61 (1927); see also 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 18 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1902) 
(discussing the cujus est solum doctrine); 1 EDWARDO COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON ch. 1, § 1(4)(a) (Charles Butler ed., 1832) 
(same); 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 621 (John M. Gould ed., 14th ed. 
1896) (asserting that “land” as one’s property “has an indefinite extent, upwards as well as 
downwards, so as to include everything terrestrial, under or over it”). 
35. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx 
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); see also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1165, 1214–18 (1967) (discussing the ethical considerations that justify waiving “just 
compensation” for Congress’s legislating “navigable airspace” into the public domain). 
36. Of course, Congress might have created mandatory easements and then compensated 
property owners.  Or, common law courts might have defined “sky” in a way that excluded the 
flyable airspace above the usable airspace. 
37. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
38. Id. at 261. 
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One might quibble at this point.  First, the passage that Lessig cites was 
not actually the basis for the decision in Causby.  The very next sentences in 
the opinion read, “But that general principle does not control the present 
case.  For the United States conceded on oral argument that if the flights over 
respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable, there would be a taking 
compensable under the Fifth Amendment.”40  Justice Douglas’s neat turn of 
phrase was obiter dicta and not part of the reasoning in support of Causby’s 
holding. 
Second, and more fundamentally, this is not “how the law usually 
works”—not even close.  Justice Douglas was the über-realist—a Supreme 
Court justice who cared not a whit for what the law required and everything 
for his own ideas about what the law should be.41  Courts rarely reverse 
centuries of precedent simply because the judges who sit on the court believe 
that the rules are contrary to their own preferences about what the law ought 
to say.  There is a relationship between technological change and legal 
change, but it is a more complex relationship than suggested by the story that 
Lessig tells about Causby. 
But I said “quibble,” and I meant it.  Let’s not miss the forest for the 
trees.  Lessig’s Causby story is designed to “pump” certain intuitions42—to 
put us in the right frame of mind for what is to come.  Technological 
changes—digitization, the internet, P2P filesharing, and the rest—bear a 
relationship to copyright law that is similar to the relationship that air travel 
bore to the cujus est solum doctrine in property law.  Lessig’s story is 
designed to soften us up, to prepare us for the possibility that intellectual 
property will need to give way to a new technological reality if the public 
interest is to be served.  Law must be responsive to the needs of technology 
and progress if our culture is to be free. 
III. The Big Bad Media Companies 
Early in the book, Lessig tells another marvelous story—the 
illuminating tale of Edwin Howard Armstrong, who invented FM radio.43  
Free Culture recounts the tale of Armstrong’s battle with RCA, which 
attempted to suppress Armstrong’s superior technology in order to protect its 
 
39. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 2–3. 
40. Causby, 328 U.S. at 261. 
41. See generally BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS (2004). 
42. On “pumping intuitions,” see generally DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE 
VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING 12 (1984) (describing the abuse by some authors of 
intuition pumps, which serve to focus the reader’s attention on the big picture at the expense of 
hard-to-follow details). 
43. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 3–6. 
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market position in AM radio.  Another good story, and again Lessig is 
making vivid a general point about law and technology.  Stakeholders in the 
status quo will use the law—both fairly and unfairly—to protect their 
interests, even at the expense of progress that is manifestly in the public 
interest. 
Lessig ties some of these ideas together towards the end of the 
Introduction: 
I have become increasingly amazed by the power of this idea of 
intellectual property and, more importantly, its power to disable 
critical thought by policy makers and citizens.  There has never been a 
time in our history when more of our “culture” was as “owned” as it is 
now.  And yet there has never been a time when the concentration of 
power to control the uses of culture has been as unquestioningly 
accepted as it is now. 
 The puzzle is, Why? 
 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value and 
importance of absolute property over ideas and culture?  Is it because 
we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an absolute 
claim was wrong? 
 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture 




Maybe.  Maybe Lessig is right and we are simply bewitched by the idea 
of intellectual property or manipulated by media giants into accepting strong 
copyright laws.  But maybe not.  Stories are not arguments.  Large corpora-
tions are easy targets: They are hardly warm and fuzzy.  But one story does 
not an argument make.  Big companies, big governments, and even “little 
guys”—history is full of villainous behavior by actors of all sorts, big and 
small, public and private.  Not every story about a big company and an 
individual has the big company as the villain and the individual as the hero.  
From the fact that RCA attempted to suppress FM radio to the detriment of 
the public interest, it does not follow that the RIAA and the MPAA are 
wrong to combat P2P filesharing. 
IV. Larry and the Pirates45 
Free Culture is divided into parts, and the first five chapters are lumped 
together in a part titled Piracy.  Piracy is an important rhetorical trope in 
debates about P2P filesharing.  If the rights created by copyright were just 
 
44. Id. at 12. 
45. With apologies to Terry and the Pirates, the beloved cartoon strip.  For a brief introduction 
to the cartoon, see generally James F. Widner, Terry and the Pirates, at http://www.otr.com/ 
terry_pirate.html (last modified Dec. 7, 2003). 
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like rights in tangible property, then unauthorized copying would be like 
theft.  And if the internet were like the high seas, a zone outside the territory 
of any nation state, then P2P filesharers could be analogized to modern-day 
pirates—a common enemy of all civilized peoples.  In the piracy chapters, 
Lessig succeeds in undermining the piracy trope.  Piracy does not create new 
value, but borrowing from copyrighted works is a time honored method of 
creating things that are new and valuable.  Lessig’s success is largely a 
function of the stories that he tells, and this Part of the Review will take a 
careful look at the conclusion that Lessig draws from the tales he tells. 
In the introductory interlude that begins the chapters on piracy, Lessig 
takes aim at the rhetoric of those who campaign against P2P filesharing in 
order to protect copyright.  Of course, we are familiar with the rhetorical 
moves.  P2P users are thieves and pirates.  But Lessig thinks that this rhetoric 
is built on an implausible assumption: 
Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon the 
creative work of others, I am taking from them something of value.  
Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I should have 
their permission.  The taking of something of value from someone else 
without permission is wrong.  It is a form of piracy.
46
 
Lessig then makes a crucial move.  This move has been made before, 
but Lessig makes it deftly and clearly.  He distinguishes reproduction from 
transformation: 
[There is] a distinction that the law no longer takes care to draw—the 
distinction between republishing someone’s work on the one hand and 
building upon or transforming that work on the other.  Copyright law 
at its birth had only publishing as its concern; copyright law today 
regulates both. 
 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn’t matter 
all that much.  The technologies of publishing were expensive; that 
meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial.  Commercial 
entities could bear the burden of the law—even the burden of the 
Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become.  It was just one 
more expense of doing business. 
 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of 
the law has disappeared.  The law controls not just the creativity of 
commercial creators but effectively that of anyone.
47
 
Of course, self-publishing predates the internet.  The cassette tape 
recorder empowered everyone with modest means to create their own new 
works—compilation tapes.  The photocopy machine empowered ordinary 
instructors to produce their own new works—course materials.  P2P 
 
46. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 18. 
47. Id. at 19. 
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filesharing goes one giant step further—it empowers everyone to distribute 
works in digital form.  If I made a compilation tape, I could make copies for 
a few friends.  If I were a fanatic, I could make and distribute copies to a few 
hundred friends and strangers at a substantial cost in time and materials.  P2P 
distribution, however, reaches the whole world, and the copies that are dis-
tributed can be recopied and redistributed with almost zero loss of fidelity to 
the original.  Through computer applications such as KaZaA or Grokster, my 
ability to share is limited only by the processing capacity of my computer 
and the bandwidth of my connection to the internet. 
These are truly revolutionary changes—transformations that upset the 
basic premises upon which copyright law and copynorms are predicated.  
Traditional copyright law is premised on the idea that copying technologies 
are expensive and centralized.  The historical paradigm of copying 
technology is the printing press—a big piece of machinery that might be 
acquired by a small business but not by an ordinary household.  The law is 
pretty good at finding and controlling a relatively small number of big 
machines.  The combination of the personal computer and the internet 
changes that paradigm profoundly.  A typical household now has a set of 
devices that equal the printing press, a record stamping plant, and film 
production facility, connected to a low-cost worldwide distribution network.  
We all have a set of  “burglary tools” for intellectual property “theft” on a 
massive scale.  But is the unauthorized copying of a copyrighted work really 
theft?  And even if it is theft as a matter of law, should it be? 
In Chapter 1, Lessig tells two very compelling stories about the value 
created by copying.  The first story is about Walt Disney.  Lessig argues that 
the early history of Disney’s creative output was based on derivative works.48  
Early Disney cartoons borrowed from, parodied, and mimicked a variety of 
works.  Some were in the public domain like Snow White, while others were 
relatively new works, still in copyright—for example, Steamboat Willie 
ripped off Steamboat Bill, Jr., a Buster Keaton film.49 
The second story is about doujinshi—a form of Japanese comic book in 
which a source comic is reworked and transformed.50  Japanese copyright 
law is not so different than the copyright laws of the United States.51  So, 
quite naturally, Lessig asks why the owners of the originals don’t sue: 
It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if doujinshi are 
permitted rather than banned, but that doesn’t explain why individual 
copyright owners don’t sue nonetheless.  If the law has no general 
exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases individual manga 
 
48. Id. at 21–25. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 25–26. 
51. Id. at 26. 
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artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not a more general 
pattern of blocking this “free taking” by the doujinshi culture? 
 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question as 
often as I could.  Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by a 
friend from a major Japanese law firm.  “We don’t have enough 
lawyers,” he told me one afternoon.  There “just aren’t enough 
resources to prosecute cases like this.”
52
 
I think that something else is going on.  If just some of the producers of 
doujinshi comic books were sued or prosecuted, this might have a deterrent 
effect.  You don’t have to bring a suit against each and every infringer to 
enforce the law.  I suspect that the doujinshi phenomenon is better explained 
by copynorms—the informal social attitudes that create expectations about 
what is “okay” and what is socially unacceptable.  Doujinshi are permitted by 
Japanese copynorms.  Because these norms are internalized, the question that 
Lessig asked—“Why don’t you sue?”—is not a question that even arises 
from within the culture. 
Copynorms are the sea we swim in when we think about copyright law.  
We don’t see them, except when they begin to break down or change.  
Doujinshi are okay: they are within the accepted bounds of behavior.  P2P 
filesharing is a bit different.  P2P filesharing did not creep up on us, altering 
norms as it went.  P2P filesharing exploded, creating a big-bang 
transformation of copybehavior.  In one segment of the culture, college 
dorms and teenage bedrooms, the copynorms went one way: This is just 
sharing; it’s like swapping compilation cassette tapes.  In the IP industry, not 
unexpectedly, copynorms went another way: This is just theft; it’s like 
running a pirate CD pressing plant.  Which version of copynorms will 
prevail?  The norms embraced by the Napster generation or the norms 
pushed by the MPAA and the RIAA?  This battle over copynorms is 
paramount to the shape of copybehavior and copyright law in the future. 
Lessig offers yet another story, designed to elicit libertarian copynorms.  
Chapter 2 of Free Culture is called Mere Copyists, and it begins with another 
doozy of a story—George Eastman’s development of the roll-film camera.53  
Lessig’s important point is about the legal environment that was an essential 
prerequisite for photography to flourish: 
 What was required for this technology to flourish?  Obviously, 
Eastman’s genius was an important part.  But also important was the 
legal environment within which Eastman’s invention grew.  For early 
in the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions 
that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.  
Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional, 
 
52. Id. at 27. 
53. Id. at 31–32. 
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required permission before he could capture and print whatever image 
he wanted.  Their answer was no.
54
 
The Coase Theorem predicts that in an environment of zero transaction 
costs, the initial allocation of entitlements will not affect how resources are 
used.55  In the photography case and in the case of P2P copying of music or 
video, the zero transaction costs assumption does not hold.56  And hence the 
choice of entitlement-assigning rules may determine whether the efficient 
outcomes are reached. 
Photography is a very clever example for Lessig.  Copynorms 
concerning photography are well established.  Everyone “knows” that 
photographing a building that belongs to someone else is okay, in the deep 
sense that widely held social norms permit and protect the practice of 
photography.  Photographers, professionals and amateurs alike, may 
rightfully photograph people, places, and things without obtaining 
permission from the subject or owner.57  Law and social norms could have 
branded photographers as “pirates,” but they didn’t. 
Rhetorically, then, the photography story is effective, but it doesn’t 
really work as an argument.  There is a very real difference between 
photography and filesharing.  The subjects of photography are not (usually) 
created for the purpose of being photographed.  That is not to say that the 
subjects are not created.  Buildings are built, and you don’t have to be a 
supermodel to choose your ensemble with care.  But buildings are not built 
for the purpose of being photographed.  We don’t choose our outfits on the 
off chance that someone might take a snapshot in which we might appear.  
But music is often recorded so that copies can be sold.  Films are made so 
that they can be exhibited and sold on DVD.  Books are written so that they 
will be purchased in bookshops.  There is a fundamental disanalogy between 
photographing someone else’s property and ripping and uploading someone 
else’s song.  That disanalogy may be quite relevant to the question whether 
the label “pirate” should be applied to photographers or filesharers.  Indeed, 
the photography story can be turned around because, as Lessig understands, 
photographers don’t just copy information, they create it: Each photograph 
brings new information into the world.  And if photographs themselves were 
not protected by copyright law, the effect might be a diminished production 
 
54. Id. at 33. 
55. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
56. The real world is almost always characterized by positive transaction costs, to the profit of 
transactional lawyers everywhere. 
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (stating that there is no tort 
for photographing a person in public because “his appearance is public and open to the public eye”); 
17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2000) (“The copyright in an architectural work that has been constructed does 
not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, 
photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is 
embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.”). 
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of fine photography—a result that would make the world less aesthetically 
rich. 
Lessig’s next story goes to exactly this point of disanalogy—what we 
might call the question of incentives to produce information.  Are strong 
copyright law and strong copynorms necessary in order to provide adequate 
incentives to produce information?  The next story is about the “free 
software” (FS) (or “open-source software” (OSS)) movement.  And this story 
is really the master story of Free Culture: 
FS/OSS is software whose source code is shared.  Anyone can 
download the technology that makes a FS/OSS program run.  And 
anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of FS/OSS technology 
works can tinker with the code. 
 This opportunity creates a “completely new kind of learning 
platform,” as Brown describes.  “As soon as you start doing that, 
you . . . unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people 
can start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if 
they can improve it.”  Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. “Open 
source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.”
58
 
Linux is, of course, the prime example—the rock star of the free-software 
movement.  Linux prospers even though the Linux kernel is free—
downloadable at no charge.59 
One point of this story is that free copying is not inimical to the creation 
of open-source software.  Of course, this does not suggest that there is a free 
lunch when it comes to software.  After all, someone pays for all that Linux 
programming in foregone leisure time, foregone company time, or in some 
other way.  The point, rather, is that as long as someone is willing to pay for 
lunch, not everyone needs to pay. 
The larger lesson of Chapter 2 is that copying (and remixing) content 
can be a powerful engine of creativity.  Lessig ends the chapter, however, 
with a note of pessimism: “We’re building a technology that takes the magic 
of Kodak, mixes moving images and sound, and adds a space for 
commentary and an opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere.  But 
we’re building the law to close down that technology.”60  What law does 
Lessig have in mind?  The most likely candidate is the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act,61 but because Lessig doesn’t try for the precision of scholarly 
writing, we may never know exactly what he meant. 
 
58. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 46. 
59. For a brief history of Linux, see the Linux website at http://www.linux.org/info/index.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2005). 
60. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 47. 
61. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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Lessig offers yet another story on the theme of piracy.  And it is a 
spectacular story!  Lessig tells the tale of Jesse Jordan, a student at 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), who developed a very effective 
search engine for the files on RPI’s network.62  The search engine listed all of 
the hundreds of thousands of files on the network—including MP3-format 
and other types of music files.63  The catalog of files included lots of other 
stuff—about seventy-five percent other stuff—but nonetheless the RIAA was 
not amused.64  Jesse Jordan was served with a complaint, and the RIAA 
demanded all of his savings in exchange for dropping the suit against him.65 
The story of Jesse Jordan is an example of the filesharing phenomenon, 
where all of the equities and most of our moral intuitions are on the side of 
the defendant.  Jesse Jordan looks like an innocent victim of the big bad 
media companies.  If you are knowledgeable about copyright doctrine, you 
are likely to agree that Jordan has a compelling legal defense to the lawsuit 
filed against him—he wasn’t filesharing.  He just created a search engine—
the kind of software that we use all the time for many different purposes.  If 
anyone deserves a Sony “substantial noninfringing uses” defense,66 surely it 
is Jordan.  His story engages all of our sympathy on the side of the filesharers 
and against the content owners. 
But precisely because Jordan’s story is so compelling, it can be used to 
illustrate many points—not all of which serve the agenda of Free Culture.  In 
particular, as Lessig tells the tale, it is first and foremost a story about the 
distorting effects of litigation costs on the system of civil litigation.  
Ultimately, Jordan lost because he could not afford the $250,000 it might 
have cost to successfully assert his defenses.67  The distorting influence of 
litigation costs on the effects of copyright law ought to be taken seriously.  
But many readers will draw a different lesson from the story—the lesson that 
the RIAA is a bad actor.  Pumping that intuition may be effective rhetoric, 
but it is not a necessarily rigorous argument for an obvious reason: Just 
because the RIAA goes over the top does not mean that the policies the 
RIAA defends are not in the public interest.  Ad hominem arguments are 
usually bad ones. 
Ad hominem argument plays a role in Lessig’s next point about piracy: 
If “piracy” means using the creative property of others without their 
permission—if “if value, then right” is true—then the history of the 
 
62. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 48–52. 
63. Id. at 49–50. 
64. Id. at 50. 
65. Id. at 50–52 (noting that the RIAA’s initial demand of at least $15 million in damages was 
lowered to Jordan’s life savings, $12 thousand, to dismiss the case). 
66. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (holding that the sale 
of copying equipment does not constitute contributory infringement if it is “capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses”). 
67. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 51–52. 
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content industry is a history of piracy.  Every important sector of “big 
media” today—film, records, radio, and cable TV—was born of a kind 
of piracy so defined.  The consistent story is how last generation’s 
pirates join this generation’s country club—until now.
68
 
He begins with film, telling the story of motion-picture production 
companies that fled the East Coast for California in order to avoid Thomas 
Edison’s patents.69  He moves next to the more complicated story of the 
sound-recording industry.  Lessig points out that in the early days of the 
technology, it wasn’t clear whether sound recordings infringed sheet-music 
copyrights.  A battle over the content of the law ensued, pitting content 
proprietors against the purveyors of the new technology: 
 The innovators who developed the technology to record other 
people’s works were “sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and 
genius of American composers,” and the “music publishing industry” 
was thereby “at the complete mercy of this one pirate.”  As John 
Philip Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, “When they make 
money out of my pieces, I want a share of it.”
70
 
We know how the conflict was resolved—the Copyright Act was 
amended, extending protection to sound recordings—but this protection was 
limited in a way that is extremely important to Lessig’s argument against a 
permission-based system of intellectual property: 
But rather than simply granting the composer complete control over 
the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording 
artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once the 
composer allowed it to be recorded once.  This is the part of copyright 
law that makes cover songs possible.  Once a composer authorizes a 
recording of his song, others are free to record the same song, so long 
as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
71
 
And this precedent has been appropriated by a variety of scholars as the 
basis for proposals to set up a similar scheme for P2P filesharing.  Neil 
Netanel, for example, has argued that the benefits of P2P filesharing can be 
preserved by establishing a tax on hardware (such as MP3 players and 
computers) and then paying out the proceeds to the copyright owners based 
on their pro rata share of downloads (which would be sampled or 
monitored).72 
These stories about piracy by the ancestors of the RIAA and the MPAA 
certainly pump a set of intuitions.73 “That’s not fair”—the reader is likely to 
 
68. Id. at 53. 
69. Id. at 53–55. 
70. Id. at 56 (footnotes omitted). 
71. Id. at 56–57. 
72. Netanel, supra note 10, at 4–7. 
73. See generally DENNETT, supra note 42, at 12 (explaining “pumping of intuitions”). 
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think—if piracy was allowed for film, recorded music, radio, and cable, then 
it ought to be allowed for P2P filesharing.  But why?  Two wrongs don’t 
make a right.  We might use the same stories to pump quite a different 
intuition.  Copyright owners have been wronged before—by the recording 
industry, the broadcast industry, and the cable television industry—and the 
time has come to put this pattern of piracy to an end!  In a more 
consequentialist vein, we might ask Lessig the counterfactual question: What 
would have happened if copyright had been respected (or extended at an 
earlier stage) in each of these prior eras of piracy?  I don’t know whether 
Lessig is claiming that our history of piracy has made us better off, but we 
are entitled to be worried that he is implying this without offering evidence. 
The tale of Larry and the Pirates ends with an important and interesting 
move by Lessig.  Lessig distinguishes two forms of piracy: commercial and 
noncommercial.74  If I may be permitted to simplify Lessig’s point, the idea 
is that commercial piracy—the wholesale illegal duplication and sale of 
DVDs and CDs—is bad piracy, whereas noncommercial piracy is good 
piracy, or at least “not bad.”  Although Lessig consistently insists that 
commercial piracy is wrong, he can’t seem to resist making arguments that 
undermine his own conclusion: 
We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one hundred 
years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign 
copyrights.  We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation.  It might 
therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other 
developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years 
of our existence, treated as right. 
 That excuse isn’t terribly strong.  Technically, our law did not ban 
the taking of foreign works.  It explicitly limited itself to American 
works.  Thus the American publishers who published foreign works 
without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.  
The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law.  Asian 
law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops 
violate that law.  So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just 
a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal 
wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
75
 
Lessig doesn’t ask the next logical question.  Even if foreign 
commercial copying is legally wrong, is it really morally wrong?  Less 
developed countries (LDCs) prohibit copying of U.S. works in large part 
because of the enormous economic pressure the United States can place on 
them—through the WTO and other mechanisms.  The fact that LDCs have 
formally acquiesced to these pressures doesn’t really answer the double-
standards argument—that the United States is asking LDCs to meet a 
 
74. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 63. 
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standard that the United States itself did not meet.  Moreover, Lessig’s 
history-of-piracy arguments from Chapter 4 seem to be based on a similar 
sort of double-standard argument. 
The main point of Lessig’s discussion of piracy is to deprive the 
opponents of P2P filesharing of a rhetorical weapon—the metaphoric 
equation of piracy and copying.  For the most part, Lessig’s stories succeed 
in the task that he sets for them.  Copying is not the moral equivalent of 
piracy, because copying can and does bring new things of value into the 
world.  Stories are not arguments, however, and the implications of Lessig’s 
stories are not entirely clear.  From the fact that copying is not the moral 
equivalent of piracy, it does not follow that copyright laws are unjustified.  
Of course, Lessig concedes this, but the story-driven structure of Free 
Culture makes it difficult for us to discern just what lesson we are supposed 
to have learned from Larry and the Pirates. 
V. I Want My MP376 
All of this history is leading somewhere, and we all know where.  The 
future of copyright is deeply entwined with the future of P2P filesharing.  We 
associate P2P filesharing with Napster and its successors, but these programs 
are really just surface manifestations of the internet itself: 
 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster.  But the 
inventors of the Napster technology had not made any major 
technological innovations.  Like every great advance in innovation on 
the Internet (and, arguably, off the Internet as well), Shawn Fanning 
and crew had simply put together components that had been developed 
independently. 
 The result was spontaneous combustion.  Launched in July 1999, 
Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months.  After 
eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the 
system.  Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services 
emerged to take its place.  (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p 
service.  It boasts over 100 million members.)  These services’ 
systems are different architecturally, though not very different in 
function: Each enables users to make content available to any number 
of other users.  With a p2p system, you can share your favorite songs 
with your best friend—or your 20,000 best friends.
77
 
Lessig’s next move is to divide the world of P2P users into four 
categories, which can be summarized as follows: 
A.  There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for 
purchasing content. . . . 
 
76. Cf. Dire Straits, Money for Nothing, on BROTHERS IN ARMS (Warner Bros. 1985). 
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B.  There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before 
purchasing it. . . . 
C.  There are many who use sharing networks to get access to 
copyrighted content that is no longer sold or that they would not have 
purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. . . . 
D.  Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access to 




Take a close look at type C.  Lessig lumps together two different 
groups: (i) those who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted 
content that is no longer sold and (ii) those who would not have purchased 
because the transaction costs off the Net are too high.  Given that Lessig 
defines type A as those who would have purchased the downloaded music if 
it were not available for free online, this categorization implies that type C(ii) 
and type A exhaust the possibilities not covered by categories B, C(i), and D.  
But that isn’t the case. 
Both type A and type C(ii) are defined counterfactually.  Type A 
consists of those who would purchase music offline, if they could not get the 
content for free through P2P filesharing.79  Type C(ii) consists of those who 
would purchase music offline, if the off-internet transaction costs were the 
same as or less than the on-internet transaction costs.  But this leaves another 
logical possibility: Type E (added to Lessig’s A through D) consists of those 
who would not purchase music offline or online even with zero transaction 
costs, so long as the price includes the royalty charged by the copyright 
owner.  Roughly speaking, type E consists of those who will not even pay $1 
to download from iTunes (or perhaps fifty cents, if half of the iTunes price is 
transaction costs). 
With this distinction in mind, let’s return to Lessig’s argument: 
From the perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly 
harmful.  Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial.  Type C 
sharing is illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music 
is good) and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise 
available).  So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to 
answer—and certainly much more difficult than the current rhetoric 
around the issue suggests.
80
 
This is one of the most important passages in Free Culture, but Lessig 
makes this crucial argument with breathtaking speed.  To assess its validity, 
we need to unpack it.  Notice that in describing type C in the argument, 
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Lessig says “since the work is not otherwise available.”  That statement is 
accurate for type C(i), but not for type C(ii).  Type C(ii) works are available, 
but the P2P filesharer is simply not willing to pay the transaction costs.  Type 
E works (not included in Lessig’s typology) are available, but the P2P 
filesharer would be unwilling to pay the monopoly rent (royalty), even if the 
transaction costs were zero. 
Now things get really interesting.  What is the optimal policy for P2P 
filesharers of type A, type C(ii), and type E?  Type A consists of P2P 
filesharers who would pay for a CD if a free copy were not available via 
filesharing.  The choice of legal regimes to govern P2P filesharing will not 
determine whether type A users will actually get the content (the music).  In 
the jargon of economists, the only effect of allowing P2P filesharing for type 
A users is a “wealth transfer effect.” 
Type C(ii) users are those who would purchase music but for 
transaction costs.  The choice of legal regimes to govern P2P filesharing will 
determine whether type C(ii) users actually consume music.  If they must 
choose between paying and going without, they will go without.  Type E 
consists of P2P filesharers who would not pay for music, even with zero 
transaction costs, so long as the owner of the copyright charges a profit-
maximizing royalty.  Like type C(ii) users, if type E users must choose 
between paying and going without, they will go without; unlike type C(ii) 
users, type E users would forgo content even if transaction costs were zero. 
Lessig’s essential point is that there is a dead welfare loss if we allocate 
entitlement to the music to the copyright holder as against type C(ii) and type 
E filesharers.  Copyright owners do not benefit from holding the entitlement 
against users of either type because these users won’t pay for CDs.  Type 
C(ii) and Type E users lose (if the entitlement is assigned to the copyright 
owner) because they forgo consumption of music that they would enjoy. 
So far, so good, but Lessig’s version of the argument is incomplete.  
I’ve been going along with Lessig and treating types A, C(ii), and E as if they 
were distinct categories, but this is misleading.  A more illuminating story 
would make it clear that we all are willing to pay different amounts for dif-
ferent content.  If I am type A with respect to a given song (or collection of 
songs), this means that the price that I am willing to pay for the content 
exceeds the market price of the CD.  If I am type C(ii), then the price that I 
am willing to pay is below the market price of the CD but above the zero 
transaction cost price.  If I am type E, then the price that I am willing to pay 
is below the zero-transaction-cost royalty.  We might add type F, comprising 
those who would accept the music file only if they were paid to do so.  Any 
given song (or content file, more generally) will likely have consumers of 
types A, C(ii), E, and F. 
The fact that different consumers are willing to pay different prices for 
any given good does not create a problem for the allocation of tangible 
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resources.  The market establishes a price for the tangible resource, and those 
who derive the greatest utility from the resource purchase it.  (I am setting 
the problem of wealth effects to the side.)  But with intangible information 
(such as the pattern of bits that make up the MP3-encoded music file), there 
is no need to get the file to the consumers who will derive the greatest 
benefit.  That’s because consumption of information is nonrivalrous.  
Everyone can have a copy.  So, in the best of all possible worlds, everyone 
who derives any positive utility from the content would have a copy. 
But we do not live in the best of all possible worlds.  Our world has the 
defect that price and enforcement discrimination on the basis of demand 
curves is not feasible.  In an ideal world, copyright owners would sell copies 
to each potential buyer at a price the buyer was willing to pay.  If I am 
willing to pay $50 for a copy of the Furtwängler recording of Bruckner’s 
Seventh Symphony, I would be charged $50 or less.  But if you were only 
willing to pay $1 for the same recording, your price would be $1 or less.  
That is, the owner of the copyright in the recording would be able to engage 
in price discrimination on the basis of our demand curves—our willingness 
to purchase at different prices. 
In the actual world, however, this kind of price discrimination is 
difficult or impossible for two reasons.  First, the owner of the copyright 
doesn’t know how much you or I are willing to pay, so the owner doesn’t 
know to charge you a lower price than she charges me.  Second, even if the 
owner somehow did know how much we were willing to pay, it would be 
difficult for her to prevent you from selling your copy to me at a price that 
was higher than you were charged but lower than the price that I would be 
charged. 
The same point could be made about enforcement.  In a better world, we 
could enforce the copyright laws against type A users, but not against type 
C(ii) or E users.  But the legal system, like the copyright owner, lacks the 
information as to which users are which.  And even if the legal system had 
this information, it would be difficult to prevent type E users from selling 
their free copies to type A users. 
So the impossibility of price and enforcement discrimination means that 
we must choose between giving the copyright owner the entitlement (the 
right to prevent copying) as against type A, C(ii), and E filesharers and 
giving all P2P filesharers the entitlement to copy. 
There is one more wrinkle that we need to add to Lessig’s story.  If P2P 
filesharing were eliminated by some legal regime, then the economics of for-
pay downloading services would change.  Demand would increase, 
economies of scale would kick in, and we would expect the price per 
download to fall.  In other words, some users who are type C(ii) or E given 
the availability of free P2P filesharing would become type A users if lower 
cost, for-pay downloading were available.  This is not a criticism of Lessig’s 
argument but simply a supplement to it. 
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Now that we’ve filled in the gaps, we can see that Lessig’s version of 
the argument, although highly compressed, was essentially correct.  Free P2P 
filesharing has both costs and benefits.  When we ask ourselves how 
entitlements should be allocated, we need to look at both sides of the ledger: 
[T]he question we should be asking about file sharing is how best to 
preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent possible) the 
wrongful harm it causes artists.  The question is one of balance.  The 




Of course, we all know where Lessig will go next.  He will argue that 
the benefits of filesharing exceed the costs.  He begins with the argument that 
filesharing actually stimulates demand for CDs.  Type B users sample new 
songs, and buy more music: 
 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from 
the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.  
The “net harm” to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type 
A sharing exceeds type B.  If the record companies sold more records 
through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing 
networks would actually benefit music companies on balance.
82
 
And Lessig identifies other benefits of P2P filesharing.  Type C(i) 
involves the P2P filesharing of music that is no longer for sale.  Lessig 
argues that all of type C(i) filesharing should be counted as a benefit.  I think 
Lessig is wrong about this.  Why?  Because in the absence of free P2P 
filesharing, it is highly likely that for-pay downloading services for out-of-
print records and CDs would have emerged.  These services could not get off 
the ground given that they had to compete with free P2P filesharing.  (Free is 
better than cheap.)  But cheap for-pay downloads would likely have 
competed quite effectively with relatively expensive (and increasingly 
scarce) used copies of out-of-print records and CDs. 
Continuing, Lessig reinforces his argument that type C(i) filesharing is a 
benefit of free P2P filesharing by asking this rhetorical question: “[I]f you 
think that type C sharing should be stopped, do you think that libraries and 
used book stores should be shut as well?”83  This question is partially 
illuminating and partially misleading.  Yes, it is true that type C(i) filesharing 
is like the used book and record market in some respects, but there is an 
important difference.  Gearing up record plants or printing presses involves 
relatively high fixed costs.  So, the effective choice is between a used record 
or book and no copy at all.  Gearing up a download site for out-of-print CDs 
and records involves very low fixed costs—so low that people are willing to 
 
81. Id. at 73. 
82. Id. at 70. 
83. Id. at 72. 
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do it for no compensation at all.  In the absence of free P2P filesharing, used 
CDs of out-of-print records would compete with low-cost downloads.  So 
one might well believe that type C sharing should be stopped but that 
libraries and used book stores should remain open. 
Lessig then turns to type D filesharing.84  Type D works are either in the 
public domain or are works of which the owner of the copyright has 
consented to free copying.  In either case, the elimination of type D copying 
should count as a cost of the legal prohibition of P2P filesharing. 
So what is Lessig’s point?  Given the arguments that he has made, one 
might think that Lessig would come out for the legalization of P2P 
filesharing.  Even with all my quibbles and qualifications, it seems to me that 
two of Lessig’s arguments (if correct on the facts) are compelling.  If P2P 
filesharing actually increases demand for CDs, then there is no reason to 
restrict it—unless one could show that the optimal level of investment in 
music production requires an even greater monopoly rent from music and 
sound recording copyrights than was afforded by the pre-P2P regimes.  (That 
seems doubtful.)  And, independently, if Lessig is correct that the net welfare 
gains from free P2P sharing to type A, C(ii), and E users far exceed the costs 
to copyright owners, then it seems highly likely that we should simply 
legalize P2P filesharing.  If both arguments are correct, then the case for 
legalization is overwhelming. 
But this does not seem to be the direction in which Lessig is heading.  
After making a compelling case for legalization, Lessig seems to be 
preparing the way for some sort of compromise solution.  He ends the 
chapter by noting that we have a “tradition” of compromise between the 
interests of copyright owners and consumers.85  When the courts ruled that 
cable television operators had no obligation to pay for free broadcast signals, 
Congress created a mandatory license scheme.86  When courts ruled that the 
music recording industry had no obligation to pay sheet music copyright 
owners a royalty, Congress created a mandatory licensing scheme.87 
VI. Rights Are Wrongs 
After his quite analytic discussion of P2P filesharing, Lessig turns back 
to storytelling.  Particularly compelling is the story of Jon Else’s attempt to 
get clearance for 4.5 seconds of an episode of The Simpsons that appeared on 
a television set in one scene of a documentary about stagehands working on a 
production of Wagner’s Ring Cycle in San Francisco.88  Else considered it a 
 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 74–78 (“The history of American law has been a process of balance. . . .  In this 
adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation.”). 
86. Id. at 74–75. 
87. Id. at 55–57. 
88. Id. at 95–99. 
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small but significant touch of irony that stagehands working on Wagner’s 
epic opera were watching a middle-brow cartoon backstage, and as such he 
wanted to leave the detail in the final cut of his film.  In the end, Else was 
told that it would cost $10,000 to use the four seconds.  Of course, these four 
seconds were almost undoubtedly fair use.89  But if Else were sued, it would 
cost even more than $10,000 to successfully assert the fair use defense.  So 
Else had to use special effects to replace The Simpsons in the 4.5 seconds of 
his documentary. 
The Else story is compelling.  As was the case with the story of Jesse 
Jordan, the Else story is really a story about imperfections in the litigation 
system.  There very well may be a case for fee-shifting for successful fair use 
defenses—perhaps with a bonus to give adequate incentives for contingency 
fair use defense representation.  Else had another option, of course—a 
declaratory relief action.  This has a nifty advantage over asserting fair use 
from a defensive posture.  If you lose the declaratory relief action, then the 
party that is unreasonably contesting fair use cannot recover anything against 
you—because you haven’t yet copied. 
Lessig makes it clear what he thinks the point of the Else story is: 
 In theory, fair use means you need no permission.  The theory 
therefore supports free culture and insulates against a permission 
culture.  But in practice, fair use functions very differently.  The fuzzy 
lines of the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, 
means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight.  
The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
90
 
Chapter 10 is titled Property, and it begins with the story of Jack 
Valenti’s relentless and successful lobbying effort to give copyright holders 
property rights that are the equal of property rights in tangible resources.  
Lessig quotes Valenti, and the quotation is worth repeating: 
No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the 
counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable 
men and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the 
central theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property 
owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in 
all other property owners in the nation.  That is the issue.  That is the 
 
89. See, e.g., Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the use of 35.6 seconds of artwork displayed in a motion picture was de minimis use because it 
appeared fleetingly, was obscured, and was severely out of focus); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the copying of four notes and two 
words from 100 musical measures and 45 words was fair use).  But cf. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t 
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78–81 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the appearance of an artistic work 
in a set decoration in several brief clips of a television program totaling 26.75 seconds was not a 
protected de minimus use). 
90. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 99. 
2005] The Future of Copyright 1161 
 
question.  And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the 
debates to follow must rest.
91
 
Lessig calls this position “extremist,”92 but I would make a different 
point.  Valenti (and many other IP absolutists) simply ignore the crucial 
differences between information and tangible resources.  Consumption of 
tangible resources is rivalrous—when I drink a glass of Ridge Zinfandel, you 
cannot drink that same glass of wine.  Consumption of information is 
nonrivalrous—my copy of an MP3 file does not make yours disappear.  With 
tangible resources, property rights need to be thick and perpetual or the 
resource will fail to go to its highest and best use.  With information, thick 
and perpetual property rights prevent the resource from going to its highest 
and best use. 
Lessig’s strategy is different.  He focuses on history, not economics.  He 
wants to convince us that thick and perpetual property rights in information 
are outside our tradition—they would be new, radical, a break with history, 
an innovation, outside the norm, unusual, and unprecedented.  The first piece 
of evidence that Lessig offers is the Constitution: 
In the clause granting Congress the power to create “creative 
property,” the Constitution requires that after a “limited time,” 
Congress take back the rights that it has granted and set the “creative 
property” free to the public domain.  Yet when Congress does this, 
when the expiration of a copyright term “takes” your copyright and 
turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not have any 
obligation to pay “just compensation” for this “taking.”
93
 
So, Lessig concludes, Valenti’s call for thick and perpetual property 
rights in information goes against our constitutional tradition: 
 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of 
property are not to be accorded the same rights.  They are plainly to be 
treated differently.  Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in 
our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be 
accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner.  He is 
effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
94
 
Lessig is right.  Perpetual intellectual property rights would require a 
constitutional change.  Of course, that doesn’t settle the question of whether 
perpetual copyright would be a good idea.  Recall that Lessig himself took a 
rather cavalier attitude towards tradition in his discussion of the cujus est 
 
91. Id. at 117 (quoting Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 
4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 65 
(1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti)). 
92. Id. at 118. 
93. Id. at 119–20. 
94. Id. at 120. 
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solum doctrine in property law.95  If common sense revolted at the idea of 
limited copyright terms, then Lessig would presumably admit that the 
Constitution should be changed. 
VII. Laws, Markets, Norms, and Architecture 
At this point, Lessig shifts gears and pulls out a model.  There are, he 
says, four modalities of regulation: 
1.  Law—the constitution, statutes, regulations, and common law.
96
 
2.  Market—the operation of property and pricing.
97
 




4.  Architecture—the software or hardware that determines what is 
technologically possible (speed pumps and the layered nature of the 
Internet are both “architecture” in this sense).
99
 
Lessig then deploys the model to explain how the internet has affected 
the way law, market, norms, and architecture interact to regulate copying: 
The law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing 
penalties on those who copy and share content.  Those penalties are 
reinforced by technologies that make it hard to copy and share content 
(architecture) and expensive to copy and share content (market).  
Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all recognize—
kids, for example, taping other kids’ records.  These uses of 
copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms of our 




And Lessig argues that, pre-internet, the four modalities were in some 
sort of rough balance, but that the internet upset that balance: 
 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s 
and p2p sharing.  Now the constraint of architecture changes 
dramatically, as does the constraint of the market.  And as both the 
market and architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile 
on.  The happy balance (for the [copyright] warriors, at least) of life 





95. Id. at 1–3; see supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text. 
96. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 121. 
97. Id. at 122. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 125. 
101. Id. 
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So it is not surprising that the content industries argued that all four 
modalities should be brought to bear to reinforce copyright in response to the 
internet: 
In response to the changes the Internet had effected, the White Paper 
[prepared by the Commerce Department] argued (1) Congress should 
strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt 
innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to 
develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should 
educate kids to better protect copyright.
102
 
Lessig argues that the architecture of the internet (or digitization, 
because the same effect would have occurred without the internet) changes 
the relationship between use and copying.  Pre-internet “use” did not require 
copying, but after the internet, Lessig claims, using information requires 
copying the information: 
 Before the Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, 
there would be no plausible copyright-related argument that the 
copyright owner could make to control that use of her book.  
Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read the 
book once, ten times, or every night before you went to bed.  None of 
those instances of use—reading—could be regulated by copyright law 
because none of those uses produced a copy. 
But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different 
set of rules.  Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book only 
once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the copyright 
owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the accidental feature 
of copyright law that triggers its application upon there being a copy.  Now if 
you read the book ten times and the license says you may read it only five 
times, then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the fifth 
time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the copyright owner’s 
wish.103 
If you are reading this Review on Westlaw or Lexis or on the internet, 
you are reading a new copy.  And if you download the Review to disk, you 
make another copy.  If you open that copy, your computer creates yet another 
copy.  Digitization multiplies copies.  Every time a digital copy is used, 
another digital copy (or two or three) is produced.  And digitization creates 
the possibility that the creators of digital works can build control into the 
work itself.  Lessig gives the frightening example of the permissions that can 
be built into an Adobe eBook: 
[T]he Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls “permissions”—as if 
the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.  For 
 
102. Id. at 126. 
103. Id. at 143–44. 
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works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have the 
power—up to the limits of the copyright law.  But for work not under 
copyright, there is no such copyright power.  When my e-book of 
Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text 
selections into the memory every ten days, what that really means is 
that the eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use 




Encryption and digital rights management added to the 
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA)105 give the proprietors of digital works the power to control fair 
use—to make fair use impossible without the deployment of illegal circum-
vention technologies.  This point, while familiar to copyright scholars, has 
not yet sunk in with the public.  Lessig does a fabulous job of making this 
point vivid and real.  The architectural and legal changes made in response to 
P2P filesharing and the threat posed by digitization to copyright are like 
DDT in the ecology of creativity.  Digital rights management plus the 
DMCA plus media concentration threatens the vibrancy of our culture. 
VIII. Copyrights and Copynorms 
One of the most important points that Lessig makes in Free Culture 
concerns the mismatch between copyrights and copynorms.  Copyright law 
says that the unauthorized P2P filesharing of copyrighted works is illegal.  
Copynorms say that using P2P technologies is just fine.  We might call this 
the “normalization” of illegality.  Here is how Lessig puts it: 
As my colleague Charlie Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year 
law schools admit thousands of students who have illegally 
downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and sometimes drugs, 
illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven cars.  These are 
kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the norm.  And then 
we, as law professors, are supposed to teach them how to behave 
ethically—how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds separate, or 
honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that your case 
is over.  Generations of Americans—more significantly in some parts 
of America than in others, but still, everywhere in America today—
can’t live their lives both normally and legally, since “normally” 




104. Id. at 151 (footnote omitted). 
105. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
106. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 201. 
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This point is incredibly important.  As Lessig says, it gives us a choice: 
Either get tough and really enforce the laws or change them.  Although I am 
attracted to Lessig’s argument, I also see some weaknesses.  In particular, it 
is difficult to prove or predict the complex causal chains that result when 
there is a mismatch between norms and laws.  Yes, it seems plausible that 
turning millions of citizens into criminals would undermine respect for the 
law, but is this really the case?  Perhaps ordinary citizens are capable of 
distinguishing between those laws that cohere with social norms and those 
that don’t.  Thus, criminalizing P2P filesharing might actually sensitize 
millions of Americans to the phenomenon of overcriminalization—using the 
law to criminalize behavior that is accepted by prevailing social norms.  Is it 
necessarily the case that this is a bad thing?  I believe it is, but I don’t know 
how to prove that thesis. 
Copynorms are important for another reason, which Free Culture barely 
touches upon.  When there is a mismatch between social norms and legal 
norms, then the enforcement of legal norms may become difficult or 
impossible.  Nearly two-thirds of P2P users report that they simply do not 
care that P2P filesharing is unlawful.107  Of course, the law can deter 
copyright violations by threats of financial penalties or imprisonment, but 
contrary social norms have a way of undermining such enforcement efforts.  
Prosecutors are unlikely to view prosecution of teenagers and college 
students as a high priority—given the social perception that their use of P2P 
filesharing is normal and acceptable behavior.  Even civil actions may be 
undermined by judges or juries who simply do not believe that P2P 
filesharing is a serious wrong.  One of the great virtues of Lessig’s norm 
entrepreneurship is that it explicitly focuses our attention on the crucial 
importance of copynorms to the future of copyright law. 
IX. Eldred v. Ashcroft 
Lessig argued Eldred v. Ashcroft108 in the Supreme Court.  He lost, but 
many readers will be intrigued by Free Culture because it contains an 
extensive postmortem on the case.  Eldred was about the Copyright Term 
Extension Act (CTEA),109 the eleventh extension of copyright terms in forty 
years.  Because of the CTEA, virtually no works will pass into the public 
domain until the year 2019.  That’s because when Congress extends 
 
107. Memoranda from Mary Madden & Amanda Lenhart, Music Downloading, File-Sharing 
and Copyright, Pew Internet & American Life Project (July 2003) (“Data gathered from Pew 
Internet & American Life Project surveys fielded during March - May of 2003 show that a striking 
67% of Internet users who download music say they do not care about whether the music they have 
downloaded is copyrighted.”), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/ 
PIP_Copyright_Memo.pdf. 
108. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
109. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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copyright terms, it usually does so both prospectively to works not yet 
created, and retroactively, to works that are already in existence.  Since 
Congress has done this multiple times, Lessig argues that Congress has 
violated the constitutional requirement that copyright terms be for “limited 
times”:110 “If every time a copyright is about to expire, Congress has the 
power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what the Constitution 
plainly forbids—perpetual terms ‘on the installment plan,’ as Professor Peter 
Jaszi so nicely put it.”111 
Lessig then turns back the clock and takes us inside the reasoning that 
led him to argue Eldred as he did.  Lessig believed that the Rehnquist Court 
might well strike the CTEA down.  His reasoning was based in part on the 
so-called New Federalism cases in which the Court struck down the Gun 
Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act on the basis 
that these statutes exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause 
of the Constitution.112  Lessig argued that the CTEA similarly exceeded 
Congress’s power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, and that it should 
therefore be found unconstitutional.113 
And there certainly was a connection between the issue in Eldred and 
the New Federalism cases, but there were differences as well.  When the 
Supreme Court struck down the federal statutes at issue in Lopez and 
Morrison, states were free to fill in the gap.  But the states would not have 
been free to act in the gap left open if Lessig had persuaded the Court in 
Eldred.  States could not extend copyright terms, either prospectively or 
retrospectively.  The New Federalism cases are about limiting congressional 
power, but they are also about enhancing state power.  In other words, there 
are principled distinctions between the New Federalism cases and Eldred. 
Lessig then makes an important point about commercial value and the 
public domain.  Lessig states that retroactive copyright extension applies to 
all works, whether they are being exploited commercially or not and that 
most of the works that would now be entering the public domain have no 
commercial value.114  In fact, that’s a massive understatement.  Only a tiny 
fraction of the works that are covered by the CTEA have any commercial 
value at all.  Almost all of the films, novels, magazines, newspapers, sound 
recordings, and other works from the 1920s are entirely dormant.  Indeed, 
 
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
111. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 215–16. 
112. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones 
Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Violence Against Women 
Act). 
113. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 219–20. 
114. Id. at 221. 
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many of these properties now have fragmented or untraceable ownership.115  
But the CTEA effectively prevents these commercially worthless works from 
being digitized and stored for posterity.  Lessig doesn’t use this phrase, but I 
will: This is a crime against human culture.  It is shocking and even evil. 
Lessig then arrives at the great obstacle to his challenge to retroactive 
extensions of copyright—historical practice: 
 The argument on the government’s side came down to this: 
Congress has done it before.  It should be allowed to do it again.  The 
government claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been 
extending the term of existing copyrights.  So, the government argued, 
the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional. 
 There was some truth to the government’s claim, but not much.  We 
certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in 1831 
and in 1909.  And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending 
existing terms regularly—eleven times in forty years. 
 But this “consistency” should be kept in perspective.  Congress 
extended existing terms once in the first hundred years of the 
Republic.  It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty.  
Those rare extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of 
extending existing terms.  Whatever restraint Congress had had in the 
past, that restraint was now gone.  Congress was now in a cycle of 
extensions; there was no reason to expect that cycle would end.  This 
Court had not hesitated to intervene where Congress was in a similar 
cycle of extension.  There was no reason it couldn’t intervene here.
116
 
Lessig underestimates the power of the historical practice argument.  The 
role of precedent and practice in constitutional theory is much disputed.  
Some believe that historical practice is of virtually no relevance to 
constitutional meaning.  We must do what the Constitution says—it is 
argued—and the fact that the Constitution has been violated for a very long 
time is no excuse for continuing violations.  Intellectually, that is a powerful 
position.  Of course, many constitutional theorists disregard historical 
practice for a quite different reason.  If you are a constitutional progressive 
and believe that the living Constitution should be an instrument for the 
promotion of social progress, then you won’t care much for historical 
practice.  But the Supreme Court does care about historical practice.  Given 
that retroactive extensions have been around for more than 170 years, the 
Court would be very unlikely to strike them down, so long as the 
Constitution could be reasonably construed to permit them.  And Lessig’s 
problem was that the Constitution could be construed to permit retroactive 
 
115. Id. at 221–22 (recognizing that only 2% of copyrighted work produced between 1923 and 
1943 has any commercial value and attributing the difficulty of determining the ownership of these 
works to the lack of a coherent list of copyright owners from this time). 
116. Id. at 236. 
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extensions—so long as there is some enforceable upper limit beyond which 
Congress cannot go, retroactive extensions are consistent with the notion of 
“limited times.”  I think that Lessig’s litigation strategy was brilliant, and I 
think that he had a chance to win.  But with the benefit of hindsight, I now 
believe that the focus on retroactivity and the short shrift given to historical 
practice was a mistake.117 
Lessig had another option available.  He could have argued that 
Congress had done something unprecedented; it had, for the very first time, 
exceeded the constitutional requirement that copyright be granted for limited 
times.  But isn’t 120 years or the author’s life plus 70 years a “limited 
time?”118  I don’t think so.  I believe that the phrase “limited times” must be 
interpreted in context, that is, in the context of granting rights to authors.  
Authors are humans; they live for decades, not centuries.  Terms that are in 
excess of the longest human lives are not “limited times” in this context.119 
X. Back to the Future 
After telling the tale of Eric Eldred, Lessig actually has a proposal to 
make.  He suggests that we might require a $1 registration fee to continue a 
copyright after fifty years.120  This is a terrific idea, although given Lessig’s 
arguments, it is surprisingly modest.  First, it is unclear why Lessig would 
allow a fifty-year period before requiring reregistration.  Reregistration could 
be required periodically—perhaps as frequently as every ten years starting 
ten years after the initial registration, and the fee could be nontrivial (perhaps 
$100 indexed for inflation in $25 increments). 
Perhaps the reason for Lessig’s modesty was his realization that even a 
very modest proposal faced tremendous political obstacles.  Lessig’s 
proposal got quite a bit of attention,121 but the MPAA squashed it like a 
bug.122  The MPAA offered a variety of reasons for their opposition to the 
reregistration requirement,123 but the real reason is quite simple.  Inevitably, 
someone will screw up, and a valuable motion picture will pass into the 
 
117. There is an irony here.  In Eldred, Lessig gave tradition and historical practice short shrift.  
In Free Culture, Lessig overplays the role of tradition and historical practice. 
118. Congress has provided that a copyright shall “endure[] for a term consisting of the life of 
the author and 70 years after the author’s death.”  17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). 
119. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 27–38 (2002). 
120. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 28, at 248–49. 
121. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Bill Seeks to Loosen Copyright Law’s Grip, 
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123. Id. 
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public domain when the fifty-year period expires.  Lessig’s proposal offered 
nothing to the film industry, and it imposed a small (but not insignificant) 
cost.  So it went down in flames. 
The rest of Lessig’s positive program is contained in the afterword of 
Free Culture.  His vision of the future begins with the model offered by the 
open-source software movement: 
[I]n 1984, [Richard] Stallman began a project to build a free operating 
system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive.  That 
was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds’s 
“Linux” kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating 
system. 
 Stallman’s technique was to use copyright law to build a world of 
software that must be kept free.  Software licensed under the Free 
Software Foundation’s GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless 
the source code for that software is made available as well.  Thus, 
anyone building upon GPL’d software would have to make their 
buildings free as well.  This would assure, Stallman believed, that an 
ecology of code would develop that remained free for others to build 
upon.  His fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code 
was a byproduct. 
 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now 
do for privacy.  He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom 
that was taken for granted before.  Through the affirmative use of 
licenses that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively 
reclaiming a space where free software would survive.  He was 
actively protecting what before had been passively guaranteed.
124
 
The open-source software movement is the model for Lessig’s Creative 
Commons: 
The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the 
increasing control effected through law and technology. 
 Enter the Creative Commons.  The Creative Commons is a nonprofit 
corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at 
Stanford University.  Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable 
copyright on top of the extremes that now reign.  It does this by 
making it easy for people to build upon other people’s work, by 
making it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take 
and build upon their work.  Simple tags, tied to human-readable 
descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
125
 
Why will for-profit publishers, the recording industry, and the motion 
picture industry give away their product?  Lessig suggests that the free 
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downloads might stimulate sales enough to actually increase the profits of 
publishers, but he offers only anecdotal evidence in support of this 
conclusion.126  While it seems quite likely that free digital giveaways might 
play some role in the promotion of motion pictures, music, and books, it also 
seems unlikely that the giveaway will become the norm. 
Lessig makes a variety of other proposals, including, importantly, 
shorter copyright terms.  Lessig also proposes some kind of mandatory 
licensing scheme for content that is no longer “in print.”  And what about the 
P2P problem?  Lessig endorses the kind of scheme suggested in various 
forms by Neil Netanel, William Fisher, and others: 
 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been floated 
by Harvard law professor William Fisher.  Fisher suggests a very 
clever way around the current impasse of the Internet.  Under his plan, 
all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked with a 
digital watermark (don’t worry about how easy it is to evade these 
marks; as you’ll see, there’s no incentive to evade them).  Once the 
content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to 
monitor how many items of each content were distributed.  On the 
basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated.  The 
compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax.
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Lessig believes that if adopted this system would eventually fade away, 
replaced by some form of the iTunes model, with prices driven down by 
competition.  Why use iTunes when P2P filesharing is free?  Because iTunes 
is easier to use.  If prices go down—to fifty cents or twenty-five cents or 
even ten cents per song—then the incentive to use the for-pay systems, rather 
than P2P systems, will grow.  In this regard, it is very important to remember 
that price competition does work for copyrighted works.  In the days before 
P2P filesharing, if the latest CD by the most popular group cost too much, 
consumers would simply purchase another CD.  In the new world of for-pay 
online music, there will be price competition because there is substantial 
cross-elasticity of demand between and among various musical recordings. 
XI. And in the End 
Free Culture is an easy read but not an easy book to understand in a 
deep way.  Lessig tells lots of stories, some of which I have recounted, but 
most of which I’ve passed over in this Review.  The stories are well told and 
moving, but it is not always easy to be sure about their morals.  The moral of 
a story is the argument for which it stands, and unless the moral is spelled out 
 
126. See, e.g., id. at 112 (providing an example of a for-profit stock-movie company that, after 
making “a significant chunk [of the movie clips] available for free,” saw its “stock footage sales 
[go] up dramatically”). 
127. Id. at 301 (footnote omitted). 
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with precision, it will usually be ambiguous.  Free Culture is a deeply 
ambiguous book.  It is very clear what Lessig is against.  He is against the 
big media companies.  He is against the expansion of copyright.  He is 
against digital lockup of content through encryption backed by the 
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  
Lessig’s stories are designed to move us to be against those things as well. 
What Lessig opposes is clear, but why and what he favors instead are 
much murkier.  There are paragraphs and even chapters in Free Culture that 
make interesting claims, but Lessig does not attempt to build a sustained, 
precise argument to compliment his stories.  Lessig does make lots of 
proposals, but they come at the very end of the book and they are 
underdeveloped (and perhaps more importantly, they are not analyzed and 
supported by the kinds of arguments that economists, legal scholars, or 
policymakers need). 
Books are aimed at audiences.  As a norm entrepreneur, Lessig has 
aimed Free Culture at a very broad audience.  While Free Culture is a 
sophisticated book, aimed at an educated and literate elite, it is not an 
academic book or even the equivalent of a serious policy paper aimed at 
Congress.  He is arguing his case to the jury and not the judge.  So Free 
Culture needs to be assessed on its own terms.  It would be grossly unfair to 
judge Free Culture by the standards of the academy when the book was not 
written for academics. 
Does Free Culture succeed on its own terms?  Lessig is right, I think, to 
believe that stories are the keys to persuasion.  And Free Culture offers up a 
brilliant collection of stories that engage our passions and pluck at our 
heartstrings.  The broad rhetorical strategy of Free Culture has three 
elements.  First and foremost, Lessig wants to show how an excess of 
intellectual property can lead to results that seem silly, pernicious, or wrong.  
Second, Lessig wants to argue that our legal traditions actually sanction 
unauthorized copying.  Third, Lessig wants to show that the social forces that 
are pushing for further expansion of copyright, the big media companies, are 
the bad guys.  Lessig’s stories drive each of these three points home.  When 
read by its intended audience, Free Culture is likely to score points for its 
cause. 
Free Culture largely accomplishes the task that it set for itself, but that 
is not the end of the story.  There is a distinction between effective rhetoric 
and responsible rhetoric.  One can persuade with good arguments and with 
bad arguments.  Does Free Culture achieve its rhetorical effects using stories 
and arguments that illuminate the future of copyright?  Or did Lessig go over 
the top and take the cheap shots?  As much as I admire Lessig and his book, 
the answer to these questions must be, “A little bit of both.”  Free Culture 
tells stories that are deeply illuminating, but it also avails itself of stories that 
seem calculated to drive home ad hominem attacks.  The struggle over the 
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future of copyright can be painted as the good guys versus the bad guys, but 
that way of framing the issues does little to enlighten and much to obscure 
the real and very tough questions that need to be answered. 
Yet the rhetoric of Free Culture does not exist in a vacuum.  This 
Review is obviously not the place for a careful examination of the rhetoric 
employed on both sides of the copyfight, but I can offer my own opinion.  
And it is my opinion that there have been plenty of rhetorical excesses on all 
sides of the copyright debates.  In this context, Free Culture is actually a 
model of restraint.  Lessig manages to present an account that, while 
opinionated, is nuanced, fair, and balanced given the overheated rhetoric that, 
in my judgment, is typical. 
Read Free Culture.  If you are an intellectual property scholar or 
lawyer, you may be frustrated by the gaps and leaps in Lessig’s arguments, 
but you will be enlightened and entertained.  If you are not an intellectual 
property specialist, then you are in for a wild ride.  Lessig has written an 
intelligent, entertaining, and moving book.  Oh, and by the way, you can 
download it for free.128 
 
128. Larry Lessig, Free Content, at http://www.free-culture.cc/freecontent/ (last visited Feb. 21, 
2005). 
